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DRUG EXPERIENCE REPORTS: THEIR USE
AND ABUSE IN LITIGATION
Instead of being liberally admitted in evidence, DERs should be used only
to show notice that a reasonable manufacturer should have heeded
By HAZEL GLENN BEH
THE ADMISSIBILITY of drug experience re-
ports in drug product liability litigation is any-
thing but clear. DERs have been used to prove
causation, as the basis of expert testimony, or
to show notice to the manufacturer. Some
courts, however, have severely limited or barred
their admissibility. While DERs are of critical
importance to public safety in providing an
early warning system of potential side effects
of drugs after marketing, their use in the court-
room is controversial.
This article explores the uses of drug experi-
ence reports in the courtroom and the objec-
tions to those uses. Also discussed is the po-
tential impact of the Bendectin cases, which
have held that for public health reasons a
plaintiff's proof of causation must be of suffi-
cient certainty to protect the drug manufac-
turer from undeserved liability. At this higher
level of proof, the anecdotal drug experience
report is not relevant to the causation issue.
As to notice of potential side effects, courts
must recognize that, even if not preemptive,
the Food and Drug Administration regulations
place tight controls on the warnings and
contraindications that drug manufacturers is-
sue. Courts should find a notice of defect only
when the information received would lead the
responsible manufacturer to change its warn-
ings in accordance with federal regulations. At
this standard, anecdotal DERs are not relevant
to show that the manufacturer received notice
of a dangerous side effect sufficient to issue
new warnings. When those side effects are
proved to a degree at which the manufacturer
becomes obligated under federal regulation to
alert the medical practitioner, liability for fail-
ure to warn should arise.
DERs may still have a place in the court-
room to show constructive notice or to estab-
lish punitive damages when, through the mis-
handling of DERs or blind ignorance to the
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trends they suggest, a manufacturer fails to in-
vestigate and pursue scientific leads.
PoTENThA UsEs AND MIsusEs oF DERs
Drug experience reports, which are submit-
ted voluntarily to the drug manufacturer from
various sources, can be useful to plaintiffs in
product liability litigation. Sometimes they are
admitted as evidence that a drug caused a re-
action,' or individual or compiled DERs are
allowed to serve as the basis for expert testi-
mony about causation without being admitted
into evidence.2 More often, DERS are admit-
ted as evidence that a manufacturer had notice
of a dangerous side effect,3 or that a manufac-
turer had constructive notice because the DERS
1. See e.g., In re Richardson Merrell Inc. Bendectin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985),
affd, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1006 (1989) (plaintiffs used 96 summarized DERS as cau-
sation evidence) [hereinafter Bendectin]; Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) (summary
of DERS admitted for causation evidence).
2. See, e.g., Bendectin, supra note 1; Barson, supra note
1; Cebenka v. Upjohn, 80C-AP-67 (Del. Super.Ct., May 27,
1988) (Lexis No. 179).
3. See, e.g., Hermes v. Pfizer Inc., 848 F.2d 66 (5th Cir.
1988).
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should have led it to recognize an emerging
association.4 A manufacturer's mishandling of
DERS may serve as evidence of fraud and
cover-up, giving support to punitive damage
claims.5 Other courts refuse to admit DERS or
allow experts to rely on them as the basis of
their opinions.6
The admission of DERS into evidence or
their use by experts pose evidentiary obstacles.
DERs are hearsay-out-of-court statements of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted in
them-when plaintiffs offer them for purposes
other than notice. Their admissibility also raises
relevancy objections.
When DERS are offered to show causation,
the mere temporality between the ingestion of
the drug and the reaction does not prove the
relation of the two events. Despite the poten-
tial that DERs may come from unreliable
sources, that they may represent mere coinci-
dental events rather than causation and that
they lack scientific credibility, they may have
a prejudicial effect on a jury, especially when
they are cumulative.
When DERs are the basis of expert opinion
about causation, they must overcome the ob-
jection that experts would not rely on anec-
dotal reporting to form an opinion on causa-
tion. While Federal Rule of Evidence 703 has
been regarded as a low hurdle, it is not mean-
ingless, and courts are divided on whether these
anecdotal reports should be relied on by ex-
perts.
DERs are used to show notice of a danger-
ous side effect, supporting the claim of failure
to warn adequately. Arguably, this is the most
appropriate use of DERs. It seems logical that
a reasonable and prudent drug manufacturer
that receives reports of injuries associated with
4. See, e.g., Skill v. Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498, 511 (D.
N.J.), affd, 677 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1981) (where manufac-
turer failed to keep tabulations of strokes, smoking and
contraceptive use, jury could conclude manufacturer had
notice from adverse reaction reports).
5. See, e.g., Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 9583 (D. D.C. 1983).
6. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson Merrell Inc., 649
F.Supp. 799 (D. D.C. 1986), affd, 857 F.2d 823 (1988),
cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 218 (1989); Hagaman v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 84-2202-S (D. Kan., June
26, 1987) (Lexis No. 6124).
7. See Stanton v. Astra, 718 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1983)
(violation of FDA regulations on reporting DERs is negli-
gence per se).
8. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a).
9. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (emphasis supplied).
its drug would change the warnings to alert
prescribing physicians to that potential danger.
Drug manufacturers are subject, however, to
FDA regulations that define the manufacturer's
responsibility to issue warnings and bar the
issuance of warnings based on speculation and
unconfirmed data.
Finally, evidence of the manufacturer's han-
dling of DERs-that is, the manner in which it
keeps its records them, makes full and timely
filings to the FDA, and the vigor with which
he pursues potential leads in uncovering side
effects-is used to establish constructive no-
tice of a danger in the absence of actual no-
tice. Evidence of mishandling of DERs also
may be the basis for punitive damage claims.7
DRUG EXPERIENCE REPORTING
Since 1962 the Food and Drug Administra-
tion has required drug manufacturers in the
United States to report to it adverse drug reac-
tions known to them. An adverse drug experi-
ence is "any adverse event associated with the
use of a drug in humans, whether or not con-
sidered drug-related."' The manufacturer may
learn of adverse drug reactions from many
sources, including scientific and medical lit-
erature, post-marketing studies and spontane-
ous reports. When new and unforseen side ef-
fects from marketed drugs become apparent,
new product information issued by the manu-
facturer must incorporate those discoveries.
FDA regulations expressly provide that "label-
ing shall be revised to include a warning as
soon as there is reasonable evidence of an as-
sociation of a serious hazard with a drug; a
causal relationship need not have been
proved."9 The FDA requires that manufactur-
Manufacturers have argued that FDA regulation of both
drug approval and drug labeling preempts private tort ac-
tions. Courts have not embraced the contention but gener-
ally have looked to the FDA to provide a minimum stan-
dard for warnings. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Lab. Div. of
Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173, 1176 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988)
(listing other cases); Skill, 91 F.R.D. at 508; Brochu v. Or-
tho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981);
Barson, 682 P.2d at 836.
In addition, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2) provides that a
manufacturer may strengthen its warning beyond the FDA-
approved warning. See Note, A Question of Competence:
The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals,
103 HARv. L. REv. 773, 785 (1990) (urging compromise
position that preemption of tort claims applies if court finds
FDA "made a reasonable judgment regarding the market-
ing and labeling of the medication"). See also Preuss, Fed-
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ers issue contraindications only to "known haz-
ards and not theoretical possibilities.10
The spontaneous reporting system that gen-
erates DERs relies on voluntary notification to
the drug manufacturer or to the FDA by physi-
cians, pharmacists and other health care pro-
viders. Oral or written reports of adverse reac-
tions also come from consumers or from health
care providers through company salesmen. The
FDA regulations expressly provide that the sub-
mission of these reports by the health care pro-
vider to the manufacturer or the manufacturer's
submission of the reports to the FDA does not
constitute an admission that the drug caused or
contributed to the medical condition reported."
In fact, a study of causality should not be done
before submitting drug experience reports, as
that would delay or impede reporting need-
lessly.'2
The spontaneous reporting system is regarded
as an "early warning system," 3 and its success
depends on the free flow of information to the
manufacturer and the FDA.
The efficiency of the spontaneous reporting
system in uncovering newly discovered side
effects and adverse reactions is weakened by
underutilization, which has been attributed to
health care providers'
complacency, often resulting from the mistaken
belief that only safe drugs are allowed onto the
eral Preemption of State Tort Actions: When and How, 57
DEF. Cours. J. 434,438 (1990) (FDA labeling requirements
do not preempt or define the bounds of common law duty
to warn; there is no direct conflict between compliance with
FDA regulations and common law tort liability); Denemark,
Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Fail-
ure to Warn Against Possible Side Effects, 40 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 413, 431, citing Cooper, Drug Labeling and Prod-
ucts Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 233, 236 (1986) (bare legal
right to make a warning more strict than FDA requires may
be illusory for manufacturer whose livelihood may depend
significantly on maintaining FDA's good will).
10. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(d). A contraindication is defined
as including "those situations in which the drug should not
be used because the risk of use clearly outweighs any pos-
sible benefit. These situations include administration of the
drug to patients known to have a hypersensitivity to it; use
of the drug in patients who, because of their particular age,
sex, concomitant therapy, disease state, or other conditions,
have a substantial risk of being harmed by it; or continued
use of the drug in the face of an unacceptably hazardour
adverse reaction.
11. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(1).
12. Pearson & Kennedy, Adverse Drug Reactions and
the Food and Drug Administration, 4 J. PHARMACY PRAC
206, 211 (1989) [hereinafter Adverse Drug Reactions].
13. See Hagaman, supra note 6 (DERs only intended
market; fear of involvement in litigation or of an
investigation of prescribing habits; guilt feelings
about damage which they may have caused to
their patients; ambition to collect and publish a
personal series of cases; ignorance about what
should be reported, how to report, and the value
of reporting; diffidence to reporting mere
suspicions' and indifference to their responsibility
to contribute to the general body of knowledge
about the effects of drug treatment.
14
Underutilization of the DER reporting sys-
tem impedes the timely discovery of side ef-
fects and makes DERs less effective as an early
warning system. In litigation, however, the in-
appropriate filing of DERs and their potential
inaccuracy should be more alarming to courts
than underreporting. Some adverse reaction re-
ports made to drug manufacturers may be an
attempt at exculpation by health care provid-
ers, and others are fied by plaintiffs' attorneys
as a preliminary step in litigation. 15
After receiving a drug experience report, the
drug manufacturer usually responds by a fol-
low-up questionnaire directed to the party fil-
ing the report and inquiring about the patient,
the medical history and other relevant circum-
stances surrounding the use of the drug. The
manufacturer is required to investigate and as-
semble a file on each report. Sometimes the
follow-up information is incomplete, the fol-
low-up questionnaire is not returned or the re-
use is as "early warning method" of detecting whether ad-
ditional research is indicated for specific drug). See gener-
ally 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcrs, Injuries from Drugs, §§ 1-
11(1990).
14. 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTs, supra note 13, at § 2.
15. Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424(1985), deciding whether disqualification of counsel in a
civil case is subject to an immediate appeal as a final judg-
ment, describes in detail the saga of DERs filed for pur-
poses unintended by the designers of the reporting system.
The plaintiffs' attorneys prepared and submitted DERs of
other Bendectin users they represented and attempted to
use those DERS at the Koller trial. The trial court ruled that
it would not admit DERs submitted to the FDA more than
one year after the birth of the Koller child, thus excluding
14 that had been offered by the plaintiffs' attorney. Later he
provided the DERs to the Washington Post, which pub-
lished an article discussing the exclusion of the DERs. This
publicity, as well as an accusation that the attorneys had
attempted to induce a fraudulent statement from their own
employee, who accused them of filing a fraudulent suit,
resulted in the delay of the trial and the disqualification of
one of plaintiffs' law fins on the ground of misconduct.
See Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 117 Idaho
470, 788 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1989). See also Green, The Use
of Drug Experience Reports in Drug Product Liability Liti-
gation, PERs. INJ. REv. 855, 862-63 (1989).
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porter no longer has access to the patient. The
manufacturer has no control over variables such
as the time lapse between the reaction, the re-
porting and the follow-up, the availability of
the subject or the quality of the reporter. These
variables negatively effect the uniformity and
reliability of DERs. Some DER files contain
information about thoroughly investigated re-
actions, while others consist of no more than
initial, sketchy reports.16
DERs AND CAUSATION
A. Bendectin Legacy and Proof of Causation
The trend in the.most recent Bendectin drug
product liability cases has been to require evi-
dence of "statistically significant epidemiologi-
cal proof' to demonstrate causation. 7 This po-
sition may reduce the potential usefulness of
DERs as proof of causation.
Bendectin was a morning sickness drug pre-
scribed to some pregnant women beginning in
1956. In the 1970s public concern arose over
its teratogenic effect. Thousands of claims were
made against Merrell Dow, the drug's manu-
facturer, alleging birth deformities arising from
its use during pregnancy. While it is now gen-
erally concluded that Bendectin has no terato-
genic effect during pregnancy,"8 the lawsuits
took their toll. One court commented:
While Merrell Dow prevailed in the most
16. See Scott & Greig, Medical Product and Drug Cau-
sation: How to Prove It and Defend Against It, 56 DEF.
COuNS. J. 270, 271 (1989) (although each DER is generally
investigated by manufacturer and reported to FDA, fre-
quently there is no way to verify accuracy or acquire more
complete information) [hereinafter Medical Product and
Drug Causation]. Compilations of DERS also are main-
tained, and they may suggest areas of needed study on
unforseen side effects. See Adverse Drug Reactions, supra
note 12, at 211.
17. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc., 874 F.2d
307, modified and affd en banc, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1511 (1990). See also
Richardson, 857 F.2d at 827 ("reasonable medical cer-
tainty").
18. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc., 911
F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990), summarizes the Bendectin studies
and case law and states (at 946) that "the great weight of
scientific opinion, as is evidenced by the FDA committee
results, sides with the view that Bendectin use does not
increase the risk of having a child with birth defects." See
also Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st
Cir. 1987), in which the court declared, "We face, then, a
situation... in which... world-wide scientific investiga-
tions of Bendectin have produced no evidence establishing
that Bendectin causes limb reduction, and in which the ir-
prominent of the trials arising out of these
numerous cases.... it has also had large verdicts
entered against it in other suits, though most of
these have been reversed on appeal or overturned
on a motion for judgment n.o.v. As a result of
escalating insurance and litigation costs resulting
from these cases, and decreased use of Bendectin
flowing from the controversy surrounding its
safety, Merrell Dow has ceased production of
Bendectin.19
Plaintiffs in the many Bendectin cases relied
on the testimony of the same few experts and
studies. Both the nature and the sufficiency of
the plaintiffs' causation evidence was vigor-
ously challenged by Merrell Dow, and courts
began to question the scientific methods em-
ployed by the experts in forming opinions as
to Bendectin's teratogenicity.
In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical
Inc."' the Fifth Circuit recognized the difficulty
of weighing conflicting scientific evidence and
announced a new standard as to the sufficiency
of plaintiffs' causation evidence in drug cases:
We find, in this case, the Brocks' failure to
present statistically significant epidemiological
proof that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects
to be fatal to their case....
Hopefully, our decision will have the effect of
encouraging district judges faced with medical
and epidemiologic proof in subsequent toxic tort
cases to be especially vigilant in scrutinizing the
basis, reasoning and statistical significance of
studies presented by both sides."
relevance of Bendectin to the incidence of limb defects has
been demonstrated." See also Richardson, 649 F.Supp at
803 ("now nearly universal scientific consensus that
Bendectin has not been shown to be a teratogenic").
19. DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 943. The notable contrary case
is Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 506 A.2d
1100 (D.C. 1986), later proceeding, 563 A.2d 330 (1989),
cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1121 (1990), which overturned the
lower court's judgment n.o.v. and reinstated a $750,000
verdict for the plaintiff. In the later proceedings Merrell
Dow attempted to win a new trial based on the plaintiffs
expert's misrepresentations, but the court found that the
misrepresentation could have been discovered prior to trial
had Merrell exercised diligence, and that since the new evi-
dence went only to impeachment, it could not form the
basis for granting a new trial. 563 A.2d at 337.
20. Supra, note 17.
21. 874 at 167 (emphasis added). See also In re Swine
Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 508 F.Supp. 897 (D.
Colo. 1981), affd sub. nom. Lima v. United States, 708
F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983) (when plaintiff offered expert
and anecdotal reports to prove reaction, court said "theories
advanced by the experts . . . are speculative and are not
generally supported in the medical literature"); Zeck v.
United States, 559 F.Supp. 1345 (S.D.), affd, 720 F.2d 534
(8th Cir. 1983) (expert opinion supported by letters to edi-
Page 16
Drug Experience Reports: Their Use and Abuse in Litigation
The Brock court was particularly cognizant
of competing public health tensions at the root
of drug product liability litigation. It noted its
concern that science has an inherent inability
to pinpoint causation of a particular birth de-
fect, an inability that could lead to inconsistent
verdicts in essentially identical cases. The re-
sulting uncertainty of outcome of litigation
could cause manufacturers to withdraw poten-
tially useful drugs from the market, and the
fear of tort liability could impair the availabil-
ity of useful drugs. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the sufficiency standard for causation
proof must be high enough that it will guard
against potentially capricious results.
An alternative approach, employed by other
courts, has led to a result similar to that in
Brock. These courts considered the admissibil-
ity rather than the sufficiency of the causation
evidence. Several courts denied admission to
plaintiffs' experts' testimony by relying on Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 703, which provides:
"The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived or made known to him
at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be ad-
missible in evidence."
In both Lynch v. Merrell-National Laborato-
ries22 and Richardson by Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc.,23 the courts held- that
the plaintiffs' evidence that Bendectin was a
teratogen was not only insufficient but also in-
admissible because the overwhelming weight
of scientific studies and peer reviewed litera-
ture concluded there is no statistically signifi-
cant association between Bendectin and birth
defects. The causation evidence was based on
in vivo and in vitro animal studies, studies of
"analogous" chemicals and "reanalyzed" epi-
demiological studies in which the results of a
prior study were reanalyzed by using a differ-
ent control group (Down's syndrome children).
The reanalyzed study was not published or ref-
ereed. In Lynch the court said, "A new study
coming to a different conclusion and challeng-
ing the consensus would be admissible evi-
dence. Without such a study there is nothing
on which expert opinion on Bendectin as a
cause may be based." 4
Courts struggling with either the admissibil-
ity or sufficiency of causation evidence in drug
liability cases often confront those issues in
the context of the admissibility of DERs. Plain-
tiffs offer them as evidence of causation, argu-
ing that the ingestion of the drug caused others
to suffer similar injury, ergo, the plaintiff's in-
jury was caused by the drug. The flaw in this
logic is that the DERs offer no proof that the
drug caused the reaction reported in a DER or
that a particular plaintiff's injury and that in
the DER are similar.
B. Relevancy of DERs to Causation
The FDA encourages the voluntary submis-
sion of drug experience reports without asking
for any evidence of causation. The early warn-
ing system would be less effective if health
care providers withheld their suspicions and
reported only reactions they could demonstrate
scientifically. Reporters often are physicians,
pharmacists or patients with limited experience
with a drug. They do not observe patterns of
reactions, only isolated events. Even a compi-
lation of DERS does not rise to epidemiologi-
cal proof; only studies that control for vari-
ables can establish causation proof.
The reporting of a drug reaction is largely
the result of an injury temporal to the drug
use. A DER generated because of a temporal
reaction and offered as evidence of a causal
link between the drug and the injury may rep-
resent nothing more than coincidental injury to
an unknown third party. Gerald Faich, Direc-
tors in medical journals of anecdotal reports of blood disor-
der reaction to swine flu vaccine to establish theory of cau-
sation insufficient as matter of law).
The Fifth Circuit reads its own Brock decision narrowly,
possibly limiting the holding to drug products. In
Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 367,
reh'g granted en banc, 914 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1990), a case
involving workplace exposure to possible carcinogens, the
court specifically declined to hold that "epidemiological
proof is a necessary element in all toxic tort cases." See
Klein, Expert Testimony in Pharmaceutical Product Liabil-
ity Actions, 45 FooD DRUG CosM. LJ. 393, 411 n.86 (1990).
22. 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
23. Supra note 6. See also In re "Agent Orange" Prods.
Liab. Litig., 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1249 (E.D. N.Y. 1985), affd,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988) (as to causation in toxic torts, "courts are particu-
larly wary of unfounded expert opinion').
24. 830 F.2d at 1194. Accord Richardson, 857 F.2d at
832; Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, 897 F.2d 1159, 1163-64
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 370 (1990); Whelan
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Civ. No. 83-3108 (D. D.C.,
Aug. 30, 1990) (Lexis No. 11504). But see Longmore v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 737 F.Supp 1117 (D.C. Idaho
1990) (refusing summary judgment on similar facts).
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tor of the Office of Epidemiology and Biosta-
tistics at the FDA, stated:
Despite their usefulness, one or even many
reports of adverse reactions often do not provide
sufficient information to confirm that a drug
caused the reaction. A reaction may be caused by
the suspect drug, another drug that a patient is
taking, or the underlying diseases for which the
drug was prescribed; it may also be entirely
coincidental. Thus, adverse reaction monitoring
should be viewed primarily as a means for
identifying potential problems. Confounding is
particularly likely when the drug exposure and
the outcome are relatively common. In the case
of doxylamine-pyridoxine (Bendectin), for
example, there were large numbers of reports of
congenital defects associated with exposure to
the drug, simply because there was widespread
use of the drug during pregnancy; the coincidental,
non-causal nature of the association appears to
have been demonstrated.?
While courts consistently have held that a
mere temporal association does not establish
causation, 26 they disagree whether DERs are
relevant evidence to prove causation. In In re
Richardson Merrell Inc. Bendectin Products Li-
ability Litigation,27 the manufacturer was
granted judgment n.o.v., and the plaintiff ap-
pealed, claiming that the court had been too
restrictive in refusing to admit 1,200 DERs.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting without criti-
cism that 96 summarized DERs had been ad-
mitted and that several experts specifically de-
scribed and relied on approximately a dozen
DERs. In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc.'
the Utah Supreme Court admitted an exhibit
summarizing DERs to show causation.
Neither Richardson Merrell nor Barson, how-
ever, clearly stands for the proposition that
25. Special Report: Adverse-Drug-Reaction Monitoring,
314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1589, 1591 (June 12, 1986).
26. See, e.g., Heyman v. United States, 506 F.Supp 1145,
1149 (S.D. Fla. 1981), in which the court said, "A mere
temporal relation between any event and an illness does not
demonstrate any causal connection between the two events.
To demonstrate such a connection, statistical studies must
be conducted; otherwise the temporal relationship may be
simply the result of chance." See also Saxe v. United States,
577 F.Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Peterson v. United
States, 569 F.Supp. 676 (D. Idaho 1983).
27. 624 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff d, 857 F.2d
290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
28. 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
29. Supra note 6.
DERs are relevant evidence. In Richardson-
Merrell the plaintiffs were raising the limited
issue of admissibility on appeal. In Barson the
defendant failed to make timely objection and
raised a hearsay objection only on appeal. Thus,
neither court squarely faced the relevance is-
sue. These cases suggest that DERs can be
evidence reasonably relied on by testifying ex-
perts who may find that they are relevant to
establish causation, although they are not ad-
mitted into evidence for that purpose.
In Hagaman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cal Inc. the federal district court in Kansas
held that DERs are not relevant evidence of
causation because they represent nothing more
than coincidence. The court said:
. . . DER's are an unscientific sample of
experiences at best. It appears uncontroverted that
their primary usefulness is as a red flag
mechanism that could, in certain instances, tip
off the drug manufacturers and the medical
community that a certain drug may have some
contraindications. Plaintiffs cannot seriously
disagree with the proposition that the mere fact
that a woman, or any number of women for that
matter, took Bendectin during pregnancy and
delivered a child with a birth defect does not
establish causation.... Therefore, plaintiffs' proof
of causation will have to be supported by
something other than unreliable reports of the
coincidence of Bendectin and birth defects. 29
This perspective ensures that the defendant
will not be confronted with prejudicial evidence
suggesting to a lay jury that a causal connec-
tion exists where none has been proved scien-
tifically. The DER collection process does not
ensure that each DER represents a thoroughly
investigated complaint, the collection of com-
plaints does not prove a causal link and the
process contains its own biases. Therefore, the
exclusion of this evidence may best serve the
truth-seeking process.
C. DERs Face Hearsay Objection
When DERs are offered as causation evi-
dence, they represent hearsay because they are
"offered to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted," within the meaning of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801. Plaintiffs assert that the drug
caused the reaction reported in the DERs, that
the plaintiffs' reaction was sufficiently similar
to those described in the DERS and that the
Page 18
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jury can infer the drug caused their reactions.
DERs represent multiple levels of hearsay.
The reporter may be a physician, attorney or
pharmacist, for example, who is merely relay-
ing information provided by a patient, client or
consumer. In addition, the reports often are
transcribed by the manufacturer to the proper
form as required by the FDA, and ultimately
the files are maintained by the FDA. In order
to be admissible, DERs must fit within one of
the hearsay exceptions.
In Muilenberg v. Upjohn Co.30 the Michigan
Court of Appeals considered whether DERs
maintained by Upjohn constituted "records of
regularly conducted activit[ies]," so as to come
within the exception of Michigan Evidence Rule
803(6), which is identical to Federal Rule
803(6). The court concluded that the DER docu-
ments satisfied neither the letter nor the spirit
of that exception:
There is nothing to conclusively determine the
time lapse between the doctor's discoveries and
the recording of them. Whether or not the contents
of the document were recorded at or near the
time of the reported event is left to speculation.
Moreover, Upjohn did not keep a record of the
reactions to the drug "in the regular course of
business," as the term is used in the court rule.
The company does not draft the reports. It is
dependent on information from the doctors. The
document was nothing more than a compilation
of outside information which the defendant had
received. 31
The court went on to liken DERs to surveys
that are "routinely excluded as being nothing
more than a compilation of hearsay." DERs
also can be likened to accident reports filed by
witness bystanders under no duty to file a re-
port. The unreliable nature of DERs and the
lack of control that the manufacturer has over
their creation is unsettling to courts that con-
front the hearsay issue.32
DERs do not fit easily in any of the excep-
tions to the hearsay rules set forth in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. They are not made by
the manufacturer in the regular course of busi-
ness (Rule 803(6)) but are unverified out-of-
court statements to the manufacturers by other
persons. They are not regularly kept records of
the physician, nor are they present sense im-
pressions under Rule 803(1) or statements of
the declarant's then existing physical condi-
tion under Rule 803(2). Neither are they made
solely "for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history," as
required by Rule 803(4).
On the other hand, it is possible for a less
demanding court to conclude that a particular
DER overcomes the hearsay exception because
it was compiled by a doctor as part of his medi-
cal treatment or as part of his business records.
When retained by the manufacturer, a DER
conceivably becomes part of its business
records, and when transferred to the FDA, it
becomes a public record.3 The difficulty with
this analysis is that a DER has no indicia of
reliability at its inception, and it cannot gain
reliability merely because responsible parties
now possess it.
D. DERs Raise Collateral Issues Regarding
Collection Process
The admissibility of DERs demands inquiry
into the collection process for each DER and
its similarity to plaintiff's injury, no matter
whether DERs are used to show notice to the
manufacturer or causation. DERs admitted into
evidence must be "sufficiently similar" to
plaintiff's injury so that the objections of un-
fair prejudice and relevancy are overcome.34
30. 115 Mich.App. 316, 320 N.W.2d 358 (1982). See
also Cosgrove, 117 Idaho 470, 788 P.2d 1293, 1298 (DERs
are clearly hearsay and not within any exception) (applying
Idaho law).
31. 115 Mich.App. at -, 320 N.W.2d at 364. See Medi-
cal Product and Drug Causation, supra note 16, at 272
(discussing double hearsay issue of DERs).
32. See Cosgrove, 788 P.2d at 1299 ("unreliable hear-
say nature"); Richardson, 649 F.Supp. at 801 n.5 ("anec-
dotal case reports" of birth defects observed in offspring of
mothers whose histories included Bendectin usage and not
within exception to hearsay rule).
33. It is remarkable that some courts have admitted DERS
as causation evidence. In Barson, 682 P.2d at 839, Squibb
argued on appeal that an exhibit including a compilation of
DERS was hearsay, but the court noted that the objection
made at trial was not based on the hearsay rule. The court
also rejected Squibb's claim that experts would not rely on
DERs to form opinions and seemed particularly persuaded
that DERs were reliable data provided by physicians and
continually monitored by the FDA. See also Bendection,
624 F.Supp. 1212; Zeck, 559 F.Supp. at 1349 (allowing
anecdotal letters in medical journals to serve as causal evi-
dence but holding evidence insufficient as matter of law).
34. See, e.g., Bendection, 624 F.Supp. at 1233, in which
the court stated, on the plaintiff's motion to admit 1,200
DERs, "I will hear counsel as to whether or not selected
drug experience reports may be admitted. I'm not holding
that they are inadmissable in toto." See also Cebenka, supra
note 1 (DERs must be sufficiently related); Famum v. Bristol
Myers Co., 107 N.H. 165, 219 A.2d 277, 279 (1966) (al-
lowing discovery of consumer complaints of similar injury
before and after plaintiff's injury as evidence of causation).
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Courts that demand DERs represent reliable
information of sufficiently similar reactions find
the task of ensuring this reliability and similar-
ity raises collateral issues that may prolong the
trial. On the other hand, allowing plaintiffs to
introduce DERs en masse to show causation or
even notice without regard to similarity and
reliability is unfair to defendants.3 1
Manufacturers are required by FDA regula-
tions to keep the identity of DER reporters and
their patients confidential. This anonymity may
prevent plaintiffs from establishing that DERs
are accurate and sufficiently similar. The use-
fulness of DERs, if offered as evidence of cau-
sation, is doubtful unless the veracity of each
report is demonstrated.36
E. Role of Anecdotal Evidence in Forming
Expert Opinion
Even without being admitted into evidence,
DERs have a potential use at trial as a basis
for expert testimony. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 expert witnesses may rely on
inadmissible evidence if it is "of a type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field." For those courts that demand statis-
tically significant causation evidence, it should
follow that DERs do not contribute to causa-
tion proof.
Typically, however, Rule 703 has been a low
hurdle. The Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee's Note to the rule cautions that,
while the rule is liberal, it is not meaningless.
A court, for example, would not be justified in
"admitting in evidence the opinion of an
35. See, e.g., Quillen v. Int'l Playtex Inc., 789 F.2d 1041
(4th Cir. 1986) (excluding prior complaints of vaginal
sloughing and ulcerations where plaintiff suffered from toxic
shock syndrome); Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 555
F.Supp. 613 (D. N.J. 1982) (excluding other complaints
regarding Rely tampons where plaintiff suffered from toxic
shock syndrome). Cf. Hermes, 848 F.2d 66 (allowing DERs
reporting temporary jaw disorder to establish notice of risk
of permanent jaw disorder); Savina v. Sterling Drug Inc.,
247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915 (1990) (allowing DERs report-
ing transitory paralysis related to myelogram to establish
notice of risk of permanent paralysis).
36. In Newsom v. Breon Laboratories, 709 S.W.2d 559
(Tenn. 1986), the Supreme Court of Tennessee limited the
disclosure of DER reporters to 12 physicians who had re-
ported experiences with drugs involved in the litigation,
protecting some 350 or 400 DERs.
37. 682 P.2d 832.
38. 911 F.2d at 953.
39. Supra note 1.
'accidentologist' as to the point of impact in
an automobile collision based on statements of
bystanders, since this requirement is not satis-
fied." A DER might be characterized as a by-
stander observation of an injury and nothing
more than the bystander's opinion as to the
cause. While an expert might rely on such a
report to lead the way to scientific study, argu-
ably an expert would not rely on DERS to
form an opinion of causation.
Barson37 is an example of a case that al-
lowed expert testimony based on DERs. The
plaintiff's expert relied in part on DERs to form
an opinion that a progestational drug prescribed
to a pregnant female resulted in birth defects
to her child. The court remarked that DERs are
"reports or observations not in evidence, made
or compiled by others, [and] that experts in the
FDA or elsewhere could reasonably rely on
them to assist them in forming an opinion."
In DeLuca the Third Circuit was well aware
of the serious weaknesses of the expert's theo-
ries, as viewed by other courts, but it said that
those weaknesses were not an appropriate in-
quiry under Rule 703. "Rule 703 is satisfied
once there is a showing that an expert's testi-
mony is based on the type of data a reasonable
expert in the field would use in rendering an
opinion on the subject at issue; it does not
address the reliability or general acceptance of
an expert's methodology. '38
Cebenka v. Upjohn 9 is one of the best ex-
amples of an effective use of DERs as basis
for expert opinion. The expert relied on three
DERs to show a cluster of contamination, the
defect in the drug of which plaintiff complained.
There seems little doubt that DERs would be
an effective way to prove the "bad batch" ef-
fect because of the similarity between events.
But while allowed as the basis for expert opin-
ion, the DERs were excluded from evidence in
Cebenka.
However, not all courts allow DERs to be
used as part of the basis for expert opinion,
recognizing that while DERs do have a place
in science, they are not used to form opinions
about causation but merely as early warning to
potential relationships. In Hagaman the court
concluded that DERs were not a proper basis
for expert opinion on causation, stating:
As far as being the basis of an expert's opinion,
the court will allow the expert to rely on the
DER's only to the extent of their intended use:
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As an early warning method of detecting whether
additional research is indicated for a specific drug.
The inherent unreliability of the DER's requires
this court to prohibit their use as a basis for
causation. Therefore, plaintiffs' experts may,
through appropriately tailored testimony, explain
the impact that the DER's may have had in
alerting the medical profession to possible
problems with Bendectin, but the experts may
not used the reports in framing a conclusion as to
the teratogenicity of Bendectin. 4°
Barring expert reliance on anecdotal evidence
is not unusual in drug product liability cases.
In In re Swine Flu Immunization Product Li-
ability Litigation4' the Center for Disease Con-
trol determined that a causal relationship be-
tween Guillain-Barre syndrome and the swine
flu vaccine could be established only when the
onset of symptoms occurred within 10 weeks
of inoculation. The plaintiff's symptoms pre-
sented themselves in 17 weeks, but he sought
to admit anecdotal evidence of other patients
diagnosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome, evi-
dence the plaintiff's experts said would be re-
lied on by epidemiologists. The defendant's
experts, however, testified that this sort of an-
ecdotal data would not be relied on because of
the possibility of questionable diagnoses and
incomplete information. The trial court deter-
mined that anecdotal evidence was not a proper
basis for expert opinion on causation.42
DERs As EVIDENCE OF NoTIcE
TO REASONABLE MANUFACTURER
The duty of a drug manufacturer is to warn
of (1) dangers of which it knows and (2) dan-
gers of which it should in the exercise of rea-
sonable care know, if (3) those dangers are
reasonably to be foreseen in the use of the
drug.43 The issue is whether DERs provide suf-
ficient knowledge of a danger to obligate a
manufacturer to warn the plaintiff. The manu-
facturer looks to the FDA to define its obliga-
tion to warn the prescribing physician and so
too should the courts.
When used to show notice of a dangerous
product, DERs are not hearsay since the verac-
ity of the reports is not in question. It is ap-
pealing to assume that a company that receives
reports of injuries associated with its product
has received notice of a dangerous condition,
but there are counter arguments to this sim-
plistic view.
First, since DERs are not regarded as proof
of a causal link between the drug and the in-
jury, their receipt by the manufacturer argu-
ably constitutes an early warning, not actual
notice. If DERs merely raise the suspicions of
a manufacturer, then perhaps a duty to investi-
gate arises rather than a duty to warn.
Second, the FDA mandates that drug manu-
facturers' contraindications contain "known"
and not "theoretical" hazards and that warn-
ings be changed when "there is reasonable evi-
dence of an association of a serious hazard,"
even if a "causal relationship" has not been
proved. The regulations further state that
"boxed warnings," those warning of a particu-
larly serious injury, "shall be based on clinical
data, but serious animal toxicity may also be
the basis of a boxed warning in the absense of
clinical data." In regard to drug interactions,
the regulations require that the labeling be based
on clinically significant studies and not "drug
interactions supported by animal or in vitro
experiments... unless data [are] shown to be
clinically relevant."" The concern is that if la-
beling becomes overly cautious, warning of any
potential risk or reaction, the labels may be
disbelieved and ineffective.
The competing tensions at the root of the
labeling requirements are to warn the product
prescriber of known side effects without over-
alarming physicians so that valuable drugs are
underused and without over-labeling so that
the labeling is discredited. Therefore, estab-
lishing notice in a product liability case should
balance these public health tensions by requir-
ing a plaintiff to show that a manufacturer had
a duty to issue warnings in compliance with
FDA regulations. To hold manufacturers to a
higher standard contravenes the policy behind
the FDA's regulations requiring credible label-
ing.
40. Supra note 6.
41. 508 F.Supp 897, supra note 21.
42. See also Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. 1223, which is
consistent. There the court did not allow affidavit checklists
provided by affiant veterans to the plaintiffs' attorneys to
show causation.
43. MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2d § 23.11 (1988).
Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 44 Cal.3d
1049, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988). superceding
227 Cal.Rptr. 768 (Cal.App. 1986), in which the California
Supreme Court eliminated strict liability in all pharmaceuti-
cal cases, is an example of the growing judicial trend favor-
ing drug manufacturers in order to protect the public's ac-
cess to potentially useful drugs.
44. 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57(d), 201.57(e) and 201.57(f)(4)(i).
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Sufficient notice to give rise to the FDA's
mandatory duty to warn the prescribing physi-
cian turns on "scientific notice" or a proved
association between the drug and the reaction.
Despite the FDA regulations, courts are incon-
sistent as to the level of notice required to
establish the duty to warn. Although DERs do
not establish causation, courts are willing to
allow them for the purpose of showing notice
to a manufacturer.
In Hermes v. Pfizer Inc.45 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the admission of DERs that revealed
somewhat related, although dissimilar, reactions
to the drug Sinequan prior to the plaintiff's
injury. The plaintiff suffered permanent "hunt-
ing jaw," allegedly as a result ingesting
Sinequan. While Pfizer's warning included the
possibility of temporary jaw symptoms, it as-
serted that it had no notice of permanent jaw
injuries. The court did not adequately address
this, noting instead that the jury had before it
an FDA computer printout of adverse drug re-
action reports concerning Sinequan, "evidence
that reports of extrapyramidal symptoms were
recorded as early as 1970." The court concluded
that this "constructive knowledge" arose de-
spite Pfizer's assertion that there had been no
case of permanent injury shown.
The federal district court in Skill v. Martinez46
admitted 10 of 60 DERs on the issue of defec-
tive warnings. The plaintiff, a cigarette smoker,
argued that Ortho had received "a roomful" of
reports of strokes associated with its contra-
ceptive. The plaintiff also asserted that Ortho
45. 848 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1988). Compare Mauldin v.
Upjohn Co., 697 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the
plaintiff introduced DERs of both related and unrelated types
of injuries, but the trial court provided a limiting instruction
and concluded that the prejudicial nature did not influence
the jury.
46. 91 F.R.D. 498 (D. N.J. 1981).
47. Id. at 511.
48. See, e.g., Hermes, 848 F.2d at 68 (whether there is
duty to warn turns on manufacturer's actual knowledge,
and "constructive knowledge as measured by scientific lit-
erature and other available means of communication").
49. See Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc., 546
A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988), in which the court stated in drug
manufacturers' capacity as experts, "they must carefully
monitor the new developments and research that pertain to
the drugs they manufacture. This high standard of care en-
sures that the public will be protected from dangers as those
dangers are discovered. Liability will ensue, however, if a
manufacturer fails to disclose dangers of which it should
have known if it had vigorously monitored available infor-
mation."
Pharmaceutical Co. was negligent in not re-
cording habitual smoking in its tabulations of
adverse effects, and the association therefore
remained undiscovered. The court said:
The report [a drug experience report] referred
to in the last question was completely relevant to
the issue of defective warnings since the patient
had smoked one pack a day for eight (8) years
and had a stroke after ingesting Ortho-Novum
(Mrs. Skill smoked one-half to one pack of
cigarettes a day). It was a legitimate use of this
report for plaintiffs' counsel to point out to thejury that the fact that the patient had been a
habitual cigarette smoker was not recorded in the
Ortho tabulations....
The jury was entitled to hear that Ortho did
not warn about smoking and the pill even after
receiving these adverse reaction reports.
The court concludes that the admission of the
reports was not prejudicial and that the jury's
finding that Ortho was culpable was plausible
and not merely based on these three reports.47
The Skill court had before it ample prior sci-
entific evidence to establish knowledge of the
link between contraceptive use, smoking and
strokes. It would then appear that the issue of
notice and adequacy of warnings was estab-
lished by scientific studies, making the DERs
of little value in the trial since manufacturers
are charged with "constructive notice" of sci-
entific literature.48
Nonetheless, Skill points to a potentially valu-
able use of DERs. If a manufacturer receives
"a roomful" of adverse reports and fails to ana-
lyze them properly-for example, failing to rec-
ognize the relationship among contraceptive
use, smoking and stroke and thus fails to pur-
sue scientific research to confirm the linkage-
then DERs may be useful to demonstrate a
failure to investigate or to behave as a reason-
able manufacturer.4 9
In Hermes, on the other hand, there was a
paucity of evidence on the issue of notice. In
fact, the manufacturer presented evidence that
the DERs offered in evidence did not represent
the permanent injury of which the plaintiff com-
plained. Hermes, therefore, allowed DERs to
be used to establish notice of a potential event
(a permanent jaw disorder) from the occurrence
of a similar event (a temporary jaw disorder).
The case is particularly harsh to Pfizer because
Pfizer's warnings included the risk of a tempo-
rary jaw disorder.
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Savina v. Sterling Drug Inc.,50 much like
Hermes, is an example of a liberal use of DERs
to establish notice. The plaintiff suffered per-
manent paralysis following a diagnostic
myelogram and asserted that the contrast agents
used in the injection caused the reaction. Ster-
ling warned only of transitory paralysis. Four
DERs were alleged to establish that the manu-
facturer had notice that the drugs were capable
of causing permanent paralysis despite the ap-
parent improvement of patients represented in
those DERs. The plaintiff's expert stated that
those four cases "should have alerted Sterling
Drug to the possibility of paralysis." While Ster-
ling demonstrated that there was no DER indi-
cating permanent paralysis and argued that the
FDA prohibited warning of "unsubstantiated
comments and concerns," the Kansas Supreme
Court affirmed the use of these DERs on the
issue of notice.
Several potential methods are available to
manage the use of DERs for evidence of no-
tice without forcing drug manufacturers into a
Catch-22 in which they are barred by the FDA
from reporting warnings because they are too
speculative, yet faced with a damaging litiga-
tion weapon if they fail to act.
In McDaniel v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme5' the
Pennsylvania court remanded a product liabil-
ity case against an antibiotic manufacturer, in-
structing the trial court to allow DERs on the
issue of notice with "an expert whose testi-
mony would explain their significance." Thus
the focus might shift from the mere receipt of
DERs to the proper inquiry on the issue of
notice: What is the significance of the DERs,
and what did the manufacturer do in response
to the potential association the DERs raised?52
Unlike McDaniel, the court in Worsham v.
A.-. Robins5 3 allowed 10 DERs, which had
been cleansed of "irrelevant information," to
be used without expert opinion to prove notice
to the manufacturer. Robins disputed the medi-
cal significance of the reports, stating that for
them to be relevant, the "plaintiff would have
had to introduce expert testimonial foundation
showing that these documents would have had
significance to a pharmaceutical company in
monitoring its product." The llth Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's decision to admit the
evidence, stating that the issue at trial was
whether Robins had received notice "sufficient
to make it take action." It further concluded
that the judge properly admitted the DERs with-
out expert opinion and left the sufficiency ques-
tion to the jury. This is a troubling standard,
for it leaves the jury to determine the "reason-
able manufacturer" standard without regard to
the regulations under which that manufacturer
is constrained to operate.
Allowing DERs to be used to show notice
without expert opinion is highly questionable.
While one, two or a thousand DERs may per-
suade a jury that a manufacturer had notice of
a danger, the receipt of DERs alone is prob-
ably insufficient notice to cause a manufac-
turer to change its warnings without further
studies. The Bendectin cases demonstrate this.
If indeed Bendectin causes no birth defects, as
the courts now have generally concluded, then
Merrell-Dow, despite the receipt of many
DERS, had no notice of sufficient quality to
justify changing its warning label. The fact that
it vigorously pursued yet failed to uncover an
association between drug ingestion and birth
defects should establish the lack of notice, even
in the face of the thousands of DERs it pos-
sessed.-4
The usefulness of DERs in litigation might
best be limited to answering the question of
whether the manufacturer acted reasonably on
the receipt of DERs. Did the manufacturer ini-
tiate further studies? Did it act promptly? Did
it increase surveillance of potential associations?
Did it promptly inform the FDA? In short, did
the manufacturer behave as a reasonable drug
manufacturer would upon the receipt of DERs?
The jury should be aided by experts to answer
these questions.
50. 247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915 (1990).
51. 367 Pa.Super. 600, 533 A.2d 436 (1987), appeal
denied, 520 Pa. 589,551 A.2d 215 (1988).
52. While Hagaman, supra note 6, took a strong posi-
tion against the use of DERs, the court postulated that they
might be useful: "To the extent that the plaintiffs can pro-
duce competent evidence that defendant purposely with-
held potentially damaging DER's from the public, the court
believes that such use of the reports could be permissible."
See also Stanton by Brooks v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods.,
718 F.2d 553, 569 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing DERs to be
used to establish negligence per se for failure to file DERs
with FDA); Koller, supra note 5 (allowing evidence of mis-
handling and neglect of DERS to establish punitive dam-
ages).
53. 734 F.2d 676 (11th Cir. 1984).
54. See DeLuca, 911 F.2d 941 (detailing manufacturer's
and FDA's investigation of feared association between
Bendectin and birth defects); Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., 643 F.Supp. 238 (D. D.C. 1986) (describing numerous
studies initiated by manufacturer).
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CONCLUSION
Drug experience reports are intended to alert
drug manufacturers to the potential of undis-
covered side effects from their pharmaceuti-
cals. The current reporting system, established
to safeguard public health, is regarded as
underutilized and only an ancillary means of
uncovering side effects after drug marketing.
Plaintiffs in drug product liability actions use
DERs as evidence of causation, as the basis for
expert opinion, and as evidence of the
manufacturer's notice of side effects. The manu-
facturers argue, often effectively, that DERs
are hearsay when used to establish causation
or that they are irrelevant to causation analy-
sis. They assert that anecdotal reporting is not
a proper basis for expert opinion. Less suc-
cessfully, manufacturers contend that DERs do
not give notice of adverse side effects but are
merely the impetus for studies that eventually
lead to discoveries of unknown side effects.
Plaintiffs have a strong desire to use DERs,
especially when their evidence of causation or
notice is otherwise weak, but DERs have the
potential to prejudice because juries may reach
faulty conclusions about causation or may view
a manufacturer as indifferent to the receipt of
DERs. Therefore, defendants have an equal
stake in their exclusion. The mishandling of or
indifference to the receipt of DERs may estab-
lish neglicenge per se, may prove constructive
notice or may establish conduct supporting the
imposition of punitive damages. Courts must
give careful consideration to the generally un-
reliable nature of DERs, to their limited scien-
tific value to the manufacturer and to the regu-
latory standards under which the reasonable
drug manufacturer must operate.
With these factors in mind, courts should be
judicious in allowing DERs to serve as evi-
dence of either causation or notice, absent a
violation of the FDA regulations or egregious
conduct. In so doing, courts can most effec-
tively balance the competing tensions in de-
ciding the admissibility of DERs.
The liberal use of DERS in litigation repre-
sents a misuse of the reporting system. If, as
the court in Hagaman contended, the DER re-
porting system is only a "red flag mechanism
that could, in certain circumstances, tip off
manufacturers and the medical community that
a certain drug may have some contraindica-
tions," then DERs should have only limited
use in litigation.
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